The war in the Middle East is not simply another regional conflict — it is a crisis reshaping alliances, balances of power and strategic choices, with consequences that reach far beyond the immediate battlefronts. From the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, no country is left unaffected, and the developments have a direct bearing on Cyprus, both in terms of security and geopolitical positioning.
In an interview with Phileleftheros, Amos Nadan, Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, argues that Iran appears to be emerging from the war considerably weakened, with its traditional allies pursuing increasingly independent strategies and Arab states coalescing into an informal bloc against it. At the same time, the United States is reaffirming its decisive role as the arbiter of regional developments, while Israel is seeking to capitalise on the new landscape — though it knows that the day after will bring a reckoning on its relations with Arab states and the Palestinian question alike.
Within this volatile landscape, Turkey is emerging as an unpredictable and increasingly hard-edged actor, repositioning its role in the region and deepening its tensions with Israel. Meanwhile, Cyprus is acquiring enhanced strategic importance, with its relationship with Israel strengthening and gradually becoming one of mutual dependence. “Relations between the two countries must be deepened — not only at the military level, but within a broader framework of cooperation. There are also shared challenges and threats in the region, Turkey being one example, which further reinforces the need for convergence,” he stressed.
Cyprus and Israel were targeted by attacks, as was Turkey. If the conflict continues, could it spread to the Eastern Mediterranean?
I believe the Eastern Mediterranean is not an immediate target, but Iran’s actions affect everyone. If we try to understand what Tehran was seeking to achieve, I would say it struck multiple targets because it wanted the war to end very quickly. It hit states in order to increase pressure and prompt them to say, “stop the war, we are suffering.” We see the same pattern in the energy sector. From the outset, there were attacks or pressures affecting energy infrastructure in other countries, as well as attempts to disrupt shipping along critical sea lanes. I do not think countries like Cyprus are targets as such. However, one lesson that must be drawn — and to a large extent already has been — is that good relations with Israel, and of course with the United States, serve as a form of guarantee, particularly in terms of security and potential military support.
How is the war redrawing relations between states in the region? Are new alliances forming — and are old ones dissolving?
At the international level, Iran is the loser in all of this. What has happened is that the alliances it previously relied upon — the Houthis, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as its influence in Syria and Iraq — are no longer as strong as they were. We are now seeing that its proxy allies are no longer acting in line with Tehran’s ambitions. In truth, these actors were never fully controlled by Tehran — they always had their own interests. But today they see Iran as weaker and more vulnerable.
A second important factor is that Tehran’s actions have driven a kind of unity among the Arab states, particularly the Gulf countries. States such as Oman and Qatar, which in the past might have been considered relatively friendly or neutral towards Iran, now appear more distanced from it — or even opposed. This is giving shape to a significant anti-Iran bloc, and what is particularly interesting is that it includes states that maintain good relations with both Israel and the United States. That creates an opportunity. Depending on how events unfold, more countries may join the Abraham Accords or align more closely with Israel. That said, this brings us to the day after. Once Israel concludes operations against Iran — and possibly Lebanon — the next major challenge it will need to address is the Palestinian question and Gaza. And there will be pressure on it to make concessions in order to advance deeper cooperation with Arab states.
In what way is the war affecting relations between Turkey and Israel?
The two countries entered this war with an already deeply strained relationship. What has happened since is that Turkey has fundamentally shifted its posture in the Middle East. Some of my colleagues argue that Ankara is seeking to carve out a new regional role; some even speak of ambitions reminiscent of a kind of “caliphate” — in other words, influence over a large swath of the Middle East. I am not certain that is the actual objective, but it is clear that such ideas are circulating in domestic public discourse in our neighbouring country. Turkey has moved from being an ally of Israel to being its adversary. It backs Hamas, finances it, and Hamas members are there now. This means Turkey is functioning as a state that supports actions against Israel — and more broadly contributes to regional instability.
Today, it presents itself as a Sunni state standing behind Sunni countries, while taking the view that Israel has no rightful place in the Middle East. That is pushing it towards a harder, more radical stance. There is no sign of any change in that posture in the aftermath of the war. Turkey will most likely remain a troublesome actor in the region, fuelling tensions and feeding conflicts across the Middle East.
There are reports in the Turkish media suggesting that if Iran is weakened by the war, Turkey will become Israel’s next target. What is your view?
I think what we hear in the media is interesting, but it needs to be treated with a degree of caution. Turkey’s relationship with Israel has reversed course many times — from close ally to adversary and back again. A great deal, therefore, depends on what serves Ankara’s interests at any given moment. At the military level, however, it is perfectly clear to Turkey that a direct confrontation with Israel would create serious problems. We have seen that Israel functions as a formidable power in the Middle East, and that is without recourse to its nuclear capabilities. In the event of a major confrontation — with Turkey, for instance — the situation could escalate to extremely dangerous levels. My assessment is that things will not escalate to a military showdown, and that Turkey will continue to act indirectly, supporting and financing actors across the region.
What has the war meant for relations between Cyprus and Israel?
The war has made it abundantly clear to Israel just how important Cyprus is. It now sees Cyprus differently from how it did before — as a strategic ally that is indispensable. At the end of the day, when we talk about Israel and Cyprus, we are talking about people. The real question is what societies will do once the war is over. But it is evident that the two states need very close relations — military, economic and broader — because they are interdependent. When things improve in one country, that has a positive effect on the other, and vice versa.
This is one of the core lessons of this war: the geographic proximity between Israel and Cyprus directly binds the two sides together. These relations must be deepened — not only at the military level, but within a broader framework of cooperation. There are also shared challenges and threats in the region — Turkey being one clear example — which further reinforces the need for convergence.
So we may well see the two countries drawing even closer together?
It is very likely, though of course decisions are taken by politicians. What is now plainly apparent is that there is mutual benefit on both sides. The question is whether those who hold the levers of power will be able to seize this opportunity. That is the direction both sides ought to be moving in.
Will the United States continue to play a leading role in the Middle East?
Everything really depends on how the war ends. What has become clear so far is that the US is the dominant force in the region. It brought Hamas and Israel to a ceasefire, participated in or supported Israel’s operations in the war against Iran, and then stepped in saying, “stop the war.” In other words, the United States shaped events on its own terms, signalling to the region which direction to follow.
The real question now is what happens with Iran. If the US presses ahead on the issues of nuclear weapons and missiles, and ensures that its allies — the oil-producing states, for instance — can freely sell their oil on international markets, then it will retain its influence, perhaps even strengthen it. But if it withdraws without a robust and substantive agreement, the message sent to the peoples of the region will be that American engagement is no longer sufficient or reliable.
The US must recognise that the situation is fragile. The Kurdish example is instructive. The Americans backed the Kurds and then pulled back. So when they are now asked to get involved or support new operations — potentially against Iran — the Kurds can quite reasonably ask: “Why should we?” Everything, therefore, hinges on the decisions Washington will make.
Only Trump can end the war
The third Gulf war has already been under way for a month. Can we calculate when or how it might end?
It is fairly clear that the end of the war will be determined by the American president. That said, all sides want it to conclude, though Israel may wish to press on a little longer, as there are still objectives to achieve. The issue is that now, as talk of an endgame begins, a degree of tension is emerging. Recently, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have started to signal that they no longer want the war to end — whereas initially they were calling for it to stop. Perhaps this is because, having first opposed it, they now calculate that the risk of a worse situation than before is actually greater. What matters to them is ensuring that Iran does not end up with a regime that poses a danger to them.
Another factor to bear in mind is that at the start of the war, both Israel and the United States had set the targeting of missiles and nuclear capabilities as objectives, while also expressing hope that regime change might follow. Expectations were high, but the capacity to deliver on them was limited — and that is exactly what we are witnessing now. We also need to be realistic about expectations of an Iranian popular uprising. Ordinary citizens do not have weapons; the military does. The chances of anything happening without the military siding with protesters are very slim.
The state of the negotiations is not entirely clear. Do you have a sense of what is happening?
As is always the case in negotiations — particularly during wartime — the parties involved do not reveal all the details. However, on the basis of what is emerging from press reports and other sources, it appears that some early contacts have taken place, even through back channels. The basic picture, according to these accounts, is that the Iranian side indicated a willingness to transfer nuclear material to Russia, but not to halt production. The Iranians, for their part, have denied that any negotiations took place. There are plans for a meeting in the coming week — a formal, face-to-face engagement, which is rather different from informal back-channel contacts or telephone calls.
We should also not forget that the Iranian leadership has a domestic audience to play to: it needs to project strength and to convey the impression that it is not the one being pressed to end the war, but that it is the United States which is seeking de-escalation. Beyond the rhetoric and the public posturing, however, the substantive point is that both sides appear to want the war to end — and that is crucial. Both also understand that the end of the war will most probably leave the same regime in power in Iran. And here lies an important observation: we are talking about a regime which, according to experts with genuine inside knowledge, does not appear to have moderated — but may, in fact, have become even harder and more extreme.
If the negotiations yield no result, what might follow?
In practical terms, the war could continue for some time yet. It is often said that the belligerents will eventually exhaust themselves — that at some point they will say enough and bring it all to a close. But the reality is more complex. We need to recall what has happened in the Middle East’s protracted conflicts — Syria, Iraq, Yemen. What actually unfolded in each case was that different factions within the same state tried to exploit one another. The outcome was not stability, but chaos. And controlling a state without central authority is no easy matter. That is precisely what could happen in Iran: fragmentation into different regions or power centres, ultimately leading to a permanent state of war.
There is an argument one hears from time to time that this is not our problem — that they can fight amongst themselves as long as they do not attack the United States, Israel or Europe. In practice, however, it does not work that way. We need only recall what happened with al-Qaeda or ISIS — organisations that, in precisely these kinds of conditions, acquired the capacity to carry out major attacks and affect entire regions. I hope that both Donald Trump and Israel understand these constraints and will not push the situation to the point where the state disintegrates entirely and becomes ungovernable. The existence of a central authority is critical — because only then is there someone to talk to and negotiate with.