The agreement that ended hostilities between the US and Iran has raised hopes of de-escalation across the Middle East. Yet beneath the surface calm, critical issues remain unresolved — from Tehran’s nuclear programme and the security of the Strait of Hormuz to the broader balance of power across the region.
The overriding question is whether the agreement marks the beginning of a sustainable diplomatic process or merely a temporary pause before fresh tensions erupt, Jonathan Hill, Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London, tells Phileleftheros. At the same time, the crisis has exposed the limits of American power while demonstrating the resilience of the Iranian regime, which not only avoided collapse but appears to have come out of the confrontation with its confidence intact.
The developments have immediate implications for Israel, the Gulf states and regional alliances, and have reignited debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear programme and the risk of a new regional arms race.
For Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, the crisis served as a reminder of their geostrategic importance at a time of growing international uncertainty. “With the British Sovereign Base Areas on its soil and as the EU member state closest to the Middle East, Cyprus plays a decisive role in projecting Western influence towards the Middle East and North Africa,” he says.
How do you assess the agreement announced between Iran and the United States to end the armed conflict?
Although most people are relieved that the fighting has stopped, it will take considerable time before shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to normal, and several years before oil and gas production in the Gulf recovers to pre-conflict levels. That alone illustrates that while the agreement is an important first step, it does not resolve all the serious problems this conflict has caused.
If the two sides fail to reach a deal within the 60-day timeframe that has been set, what are the likely scenarios? Could we see fresh conflict, or perhaps a frozen conflict?
I think the United States will be extremely reluctant to resume hostilities, particularly as we will be 60 days closer to the midterm elections by then. Iran almost certainly knows this, so it would not surprise me if it looked for ways to test American resolve and staying power.
Iran’s theocratic regime, rather than collapsing, appears to have survived and may even have emerged from the crisis stronger. Is Iran likely to make concessions on any issue — especially now that it has seen what a powerful negotiating tool the closure of the Strait of Hormuz can be?
No, I don’t think it will. This crisis has laid bare the limits of Washington’s military, political and economic resolve. Specifically, the US has shown it is unwilling to invade Iran — which would be a prerequisite for regime change. It has also become clear just how significantly America’s domestic political dynamics shape its foreign policy. And the current US administration has shown it has little appetite for bearing the prolonged economic costs that come with higher energy prices. In these circumstances, Tehran is likely to conclude that it has more room to manoeuvre and fewer incentives to make meaningful concessions.
What will happen to Iran’s existing stockpiles of enriched uranium under the proposed agreement? Many analysts argue that Iran will not abandon its nuclear programme. What is your assessment?
Well, I don’t believe Iran will abandon its nuclear programme either. First, there is the enormous sunk cost. The regime has invested so much blood, money and political capital in this programme that it is hard to imagine it simply walking away. Second, US military intervention has effectively validated the value of possessing nuclear weapons. Would the US have taken the actions we have seen against an Iran that already had nuclear weapons and medium- or long-range missiles? Probably not.
Israel appears clearly unhappy with recent developments. To what extent could it defy the United States and continue strikes against Iran or Lebanon, potentially jeopardising the entire diplomatic process?
Israel will seek to see its adversaries in Iran and Lebanon weakened as much as possible. So the more it can achieve that objective, the better from its perspective. While Israel may be willing to defy Washington on certain issues, I am not sure it would risk taking actions that would lead to the complete collapse of the diplomatic process.
What will the Middle East look like the day after? Are we likely to see significant geopolitical shifts?
A weakened Iran offers some security benefits for the Middle East. Specifically, it may limit Iran’s ability to support its armed proxies and allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and by extension its capacity to threaten the wider region. However, those benefits could be eroded if Iran secures significant economic gains from the peace agreement. At the same time, the Gulf states will continue to worry about their own security and may look for new alliances or even seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
For Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, what would a US-Iran agreement mean? Do you think the crisis — despite the risks it highlighted, both in economic terms and due to geographic proximity — has actually reinforced Cyprus’s geostrategic importance?
Yes, this conflict confirms Cyprus’s strategic importance. With the British Sovereign Base Areas on its soil and as the EU member state closest to the Middle East, Cyprus plays a decisive role in projecting Western influence towards the Middle East and North Africa.
With so many serious issues deferred to future negotiations, can we identify the winners and losers from this crisis?
I am not sure there are any winners. The Iranian people have suffered enormously. The Tehran regime, though battered, has ultimately survived — and in doing so has demonstrated its determination and resilience to the international community, which may deter any future US administration from considering military action against it. The United States spent significant resources without achieving commensurate gains. The Gulf states suffered heavy losses in oil and gas revenues, and their reputation as safe destinations for tourism and investment has taken a hit. Israel, by contrast, may have benefited from seeing its adversary weakened.