Fifty-two years after the Turkish invasion, public records from the United States, the UK’s House of Commons and the United Nations shed new light on the dramatic hours that preceded the greatest tragedy in modern Cypriot history.
CNA presents an investigation based on primary sources: American and British diplomatic telegrams, UN Security Council minutes, House of Commons records, documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), UNFICYP archives, and declassified conversations among the American leadership.
The final hours before the landing
On the afternoon of July 19, 1974, four days after the coup against President Makarios, the crisis had taken on international dimensions. In Nicosia, Nikos Sampson’s “government” was trying to establish itself, while Dimitrios Ioannidis’s junta in Athens insisted the matter was an internal Cypriot affair. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had effectively decided that if the pre-coup situation was not restored, Turkey would intervene militarily. For Washington and London, the greatest concern was now preventing war between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece.
At 3:30pm New York time, the UN Security Council convened for the second emergency session in a matter of days. Before discussion even began, it rejected the Sampson government’s request to replace Cyprus’s permanent representative, Zinon Rossides, and to postpone the session, according to the minutes of the 1780th meeting (S/PV.1780). Rossides remaining in his post was a clear sign that the UN did not recognise the Sampson regime.
In his address, Archbishop Makarios said the coup had been organised by the military government in Athens and carried out by Greek officers commanding the National Guard. He accused the Greek junta of funding and directing EOKA B, and revealed that a few weeks earlier he had written to Greek President Phaedon Gizikis requesting the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus. The response he received, he said, was that doing so would weaken the island’s defence against Turkey.
“I told them I considered the danger from Athens greater than the danger from Turkey,” he told the Security Council.
Makarios further argued that the coup threatened the entire Republic of Cyprus, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and called on the UN to demand the withdrawal of Greek officers from the National Guard and the restoration of constitutional order. In the most-quoted line of his speech, he said the Greek junta’s coup “is an invasion” whose consequences all Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish, would suffer.
The Greek response
Greek representative Ioannis Panayiotakos rejected any Athens involvement, insisting the events were purely an internal Greek Cypriot matter. He argued that both the commander of ELDYK and the head of the National Guard had been in Athens before the coup, and that communications with Nicosia had been cut off.
He then attacked Makarios personally, accusing him of “personality cult” politics and demagoguery. He further accused Makarios of maintaining a paramilitary apparatus and being responsible for the persecution and political assassination of his opponents.
Ankara warns
Declassified American documents show Ankara had given advance warning of its intentions. On July 17, US Ambassador to Turkey William Macomber cabled Washington about his meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit, who described the coup as a violation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and attributed its organisation to the Athens junta.
Ecevit warned that if an “acceptable situation” was not restored, Turkey would intervene militarily. If intervention proved unavoidable, he added, it needed to happen within “a few days,” or it would be “more bloody.” He also revealed he was travelling to London to seek joint action with the UK as the second guarantor power.
“They have bases there. If they don’t use them now, what are they for?” Ecevit said. Turkey, he added, would examine all peaceful solutions before considering other options.
According to the American telegram, Turkey’s stated core objectives were restoring constitutional order, the withdrawal of Greek officers from the National Guard, and securing safe Turkish Cypriot access to the sea.
The American dilemma
On the night of July 19, while international attention was fixed on the Security Council, the critical decisions were being made in Washington, London and Ankara. FRUS documents show the US government had by then concluded Turkish intervention was highly likely, and was focusing its efforts chiefly on preventing a Greek-Turkish war that would threaten NATO cohesion during the Cold War. From the first hours after the July 15 coup, Washington had been trying to balance restoring constitutional order against preventing a Greek-Turkish clash.
In a telegram included in the FRUS documents, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reiterated that the United States recognised Cyprus as “a united, sovereign and independent state,” and made clear Washington “could not accept any action that altered the island’s political and constitutional structure.” He also called on the Greek government to show “maximum possible restraint,” warning that further destabilisation could lead to a Greek-Turkish war and boost Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Three days later, a new State Department telegram to US diplomatic missions set out Washington’s strategy even more clearly. The two core priorities were preventing Turkish military intervention and avoiding civil conflict in Cyprus that Moscow could exploit.
The same document revealed the core American dilemma. Although Makarios was still considered the legitimate President of Cyprus, US officials judged his return without outside military backing to be extremely difficult. At the same time, they rejected the Sampson regime.
“We do not accept the Sampson regime,” the telegram stated. It went on to note, however, that the regime was already in power, and it would be reckless to seek its removal before an alternative solution emerged.
Pressure on London for joint action
During this period, the British government came under intense pressure to take the lead as a guarantor power. On July 19, proposals were raised in the House of Commons for invoking rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, including even temporarily placing the National Guard under UN command.
Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs Roy Hattersley confirmed continuous contacts were under way with Athens and Ankara, while avoiding any commitment to military action.
Meanwhile, Ecevit had travelled to London on July 17 seeking joint British-Turkish intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. The talks produced no result, as Harold Wilson’s government was unwilling to take part in a military operation, leaving Ankara effectively free to act unilaterally.
Coordination in Washington as the clock ran down
As London’s efforts stalled, attention shifted back to Washington. At midday on July 19, 1974 (2:43pm–3:29pm Washington time), the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) held an emergency session in the White House Situation Room, chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, with the heads of the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA taking part.
The declassified minutes reveal a Washington that, while aware an invasion was imminent, focused its attention almost entirely on evacuating its own citizens and on the diplomatic balance between Athens, Ankara and London.
Deputy Defence Secretary William Clements reported that the US amphibious force had been ordered to approach to within 100 to 50 miles of Cyprus, roughly 10 hours from the coast. The force, following approval, comprised five ships, including a helicopter carrier, two LPD landing ships, 1,800 marines and 14 helicopters.
“The fleet’s orders are that it is moving solely for civilian evacuation purposes,” Clements said, adding that this was not for military intervention.
Uncertainty over Ioannidis
During the session, a message was relayed from Henry Kissinger, who was in San Clemente giving instructions by phone, concerning Joseph Sisco’s visit to Athens. At that point, the American team did not yet have a clear picture of whether Sisco had managed to see the “invisible dictator” Dimitrios Ioannidis, and considered it unlikely.
Toward the end of the session, a telegram arrived from Athens. The fact that the Greek side had agreed to send a representative to London on Monday, July 22, for talks was met with cautious relief.
“At least he has something to discuss,” the minutes noted, referring to Sisco’s mission in Ankara. CIA Director Bill Colby, however, identified the real problem: “The real issue is convincing the Turks to delay the invasion until Monday.”
Behind the scenes: Makarios’s plane and an assassination threat
Makarios was expected in New York, and Kissinger had scheduled a meeting with him for Monday. The State Department revealed the Cypriot side had requested a US aircraft to transport Makarios from New York to Washington, citing threats to his life.
The then US Ambassador to Cyprus, Robert James McCloskey, recommended the request be rejected, so as not to create the diplomatic impression that Washington was “leaning” toward Makarios.
CIA representative George Lauder intervened, revealing that orders had been given to “assassinate Makarios anywhere in the world at any time,” based on information from what he described as a good source.
Ultimately, Clements proposed a middle solution: providing Makarios with a small, unmarked military jet, so as to ensure his safety without signalling official political support.
The telegram that foretold the invasion
On the afternoon of July 19, US special envoy Joseph Sisco briefed Henry Kissinger on his contacts in Athens with Dimitrios Ioannidis and the head of Greece’s armed forces, General Grigorios Bonanos.
He told the Secretary of State he was departing for Ankara having secured limited concessions from the Greek side, which he personally considered insufficient to prevent Turkish military intervention. Athens had agreed to take part in talks in London with Britain and to support an enhanced UN role in controlling Cyprus’s ports and airports, but categorically rejected Turkey’s demand for Turkish Cypriot sea access, viewing it as disguised partition.
Sisco also revealed he had deliberately avoided conveying to Athens Ecevit’s proposal for full partition, judging it would collapse any diplomatic effort. As a last resort for de-escalation, he instead suggested that House Speaker Glafkos Clerides assume the presidency under the constitutional line of succession.
In the telegram’s final and most prophetic paragraph, Sisco recorded his clear conviction that diplomacy was doomed: whatever happened, he wrote, the Turks saw this as the ideal moment to achieve a long-standing objective through military intervention.
At the White House, invasion now seen as imminent
That same evening, WSAG convened again on an emergency basis, with Kissinger and senior State Department, Pentagon, CIA and National Security Council officials taking part. The minutes show the question was no longer whether Turkey would intervene, but when.
A declassified July 19, 1974 phone call between Kissinger and Colby reveals Washington had a clear picture of the impending Turkish invasion and its military objectives. The CIA assessed Turkish forces were fully prepared to land at Kyrenia, aiming to seize Kyrenia, Famagusta and a corridor connecting the two areas to secure a strong negotiating position. The CIA also expected resistance from the National Guard, but judged Greece incapable of effective military intervention due to distance and Turkey’s numerical superiority.
American discussion centred mainly on preventing a Greek-Turkish war and safely evacuating US citizens from Cyprus, including consideration of sending warships to the Eastern Mediterranean solely for evacuation operations.
As midnight on July 19 approached, US and British documents recorded that the Turkish landing fleet had already sailed from the southern coast of Asia Minor toward northern Cyprus. Operation “Attila” had effectively been launched.
In Nicosia, by contrast, the coup had caused serious disruption to the National Guard’s chain of command, and attention remained focused mainly on the internal situation rather than signs of an imminent external attack.
“They’re landing”
One of the most revealing documents in the American archives is the phone call between Henry Kissinger and Defence Secretary James Schlesinger on the night of July 19 into the early hours of July 20. Kissinger reported that Turkish forces had already begun landing.
“They’re landing,” he said.
According to the briefing he had received, Turkish units had orders not to open fire on Greek forces unless attacked. At the same time, Washington was pushing the so-called “Clerides solution”: Nikos Sampson stepping down and Glafkos Clerides assuming the presidency under constitutional succession, though Kissinger himself acknowledged the chances of success were limited.
Discussing Ankara’s real objectives, Schlesinger assessed that Turkey “would not settle for anything less than a section of the island.” Kissinger responded that if that were the goal, Washington would need to pursue a “double union” arrangement, in effect, de facto partition, leaving the rest of the island to Greece.
Dawn of the invasion
Shortly before 5am on July 20, the last hopes for diplomatic de-escalation evaporated. The Turkish landing fleet reached the northern coast of Cyprus, and Operation “Attila” began with air strikes, landings at Pente Mile west of Kyrenia, and paratroop drops north of Nicosia, aiming to link the beachhead with the Turkish Cypriot enclave in the capital.
The Turkish government announced it was acting under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, saying the intervention aimed to restore the constitutional order overturned by the coup.
Nixon-Kissinger: “If necessary, we’ll cut off military aid”
A few hours after the invasion began, President Richard Nixon was briefed by phone by Henry Kissinger.
Kissinger reported that Athens had accepted the American ceasefire proposal, while Ankara was delaying its response, seeking, in his assessment, to create military facts on the ground.
“They are trying to gain as much ground as possible,” he said, adding that Turkey had gained a strong negotiating position and that the National Guard had effectively been defeated.
Nixon asked whether there was a risk of direct Greek involvement. Kissinger replied: “If the Greeks don’t go to war by morning, I believe we’ll be fine.”
The discussion turned to the main leverage Washington believed it held. Kissinger suggested that in the event of a Greek-Turkish war, the US would cut off all military aid to both countries.
“That would stop the war,” Nixon remarked.
Shortly afterward, a new session, chaired by Ingersoll and attended by Colby, revealed the behind-the-scenes American manoeuvring on both the military and diplomatic fronts. Kissinger specifically ordered mediator Joseph Sisco to appear extremely tough with the Turkish leadership, threatening a complete cutoff of military aid.
Behind the official statements calling for a ceasefire and restoration of constitutional order, Ingersoll was already framing the “double union” compromise as the only realistic way out should negotiations fail.
At the same time, tensions between the US and the Greek junta had reached a critical point after Greek authorities forcibly requisitioned three American barges loaded with munitions bound for Turkey. This drew strong protest from US officials, who described Greece as “difficult” and proposed beginning a gradual American distancing from Athens. Fearing both a backlash in Congress and the perception that arms deliveries favoured one side, the US decided to lodge a formal protest through its ambassador in Athens, while imposing a general but temporary freeze on all military shipments to both countries.
Kissinger’s double game over the arms embargo
A top-secret phone call between Kissinger and Ingersoll reveals Washington ran a “double game” over the freeze on military aid to Greece and Turkey, with Kissinger furious at what he saw as insubordination by his staff.
While the Defence Department, under James Schlesinger, had internally announced a halt to arms shipments to both countries, Kissinger intervened forcefully to reverse the decision. He gave an explicit, cynical instruction: there should be no official announcement of any aid suspension, fearing that if it were formally halted, “we’ll never be able to start it again.” Instead, he ordered a delaying tactic — deliveries should not go ahead, but this should be presented as mere “technical delays.”
The most explosive part of the call concerned US posture toward Turkey. Kissinger was enraged to learn that Deputy Secretary of State Arthur Hartman had failed to convey to the Turkish ambassador the stern warning that Washington would cut military aid if Ankara rejected the ceasefire.
“It will be a very lonely department when I get back,” Kissinger said, after a burst of swearing. He added that he wanted Hartman’s resignation the next time an instruction was not carried out, and that he did not accept the principle that assistant secretaries had discretion once given an order.
Kissinger ordered Ingersoll to have Hartman immediately call the Turkish ambassador back and make clear, “as one friend to another,” that if Turkey did not accept the ceasefire proposal being conveyed by Sisco, this would inevitably lead to a cutoff of US aid to Ankara.
Behind the scenes of Resolution 353
Even as the Turkish invasion was under way, Washington continued pushing for a ceasefire through the Security Council. A declassified phone call between Kissinger, Ingersoll and US Ambassador to the UN John Scali reveals the American delegation was following the negotiations minute by minute.
US Ambassador to the UN Donald Bafum reported the session was running late as corridor negotiations continued. The Soviet Union, he said, was trying to amend the American draft resolution, while the US delegation held a firm line.
A central point of contention was a French proposal calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops beyond what international agreements permitted, wording that now also applied to the Turkish forces that had already landed in Cyprus.
“This might not be a bad idea… except that the Turks won’t like it,” Kissinger remarked, before ultimately agreeing to the compromise wording, while insisting: “Make sure the British and French will be with us when this happens.”
The same record captures an effort to manage the crisis’s public image. Asked about briefing journalists, Kissinger said he had kept it very low-key, and that his main concern had been to give the impression the US knew what it was doing, while stressing it needed to be clear Washington was not in confrontation with the Soviet Union.
UNFICYP’s response
From the first hours of the invasion, UNFICYP went on full alert, reinforced its observation posts, carried out continuous patrols, and tried to secure local ceasefire agreements and facilitate humanitarian operations, though it could not influence the course of the fighting.
That same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 353 (1974), demanding an immediate ceasefire, an end to all foreign military intervention, the withdrawal of foreign military personnel not provided for under international agreements, and the start of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the UK as guarantor powers.
However, by the time the resolution was adopted, Turkish forces had already established a beachhead in the Kyrenia area and were working to consolidate their positions.
The documents show the major powers had recognised early on that the crisis was heading toward a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, without making any particular effort to prevent it. The last diplomatic initiatives were exhausted just as military operations were already under way.
By dawn on July 20, 1974, diplomacy had given way to arms. In the hours that followed, the Turkish invasion shaped a new reality whose unlawful consequences continue to define Cyprus more than half a century later.
(With information from the Cyprus News Agency)