Against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire that has yet to harden into lasting peace, the Middle East is entering a new period of uncertainty in which the questions far outnumber the answers. The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran may have ended on the battlefield, but its geopolitical consequences are only beginning to make themselves felt, reshaping balances that until recently were taken for granted, says Sotiris Livas, Professor of International Relations at the Ionian University, in an interview with Phileleftheros.
The survival of the Iranian regime, the resilience of Tehran’s power structures, and Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s failure to achieve several of their core objectives are all feeding a broader debate about the limits of military force and the effectiveness of strategic pressure. “The consequences will begin to manifest in the period ahead, but they will of course be continuously reassessed as events unfold. Iran’s resilience will play its part in strengthening the country’s position in the region,” he said.
The Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive factor, having emerged as Tehran’s most powerful bargaining chip. Iran’s ability to influence global energy flows and shipping strengthens its negotiating hand while simultaneously creating new headaches for the United States, its Gulf allies and international markets.
For Cyprus, these developments are not some distant geopolitical crisis but a reality with direct implications for the island’s security, economy and strategic position in the region. As the European Union member state closest to the Middle East, Cyprus is on the front line of regional realignment, closely watching the potential fallout from the shifting US–Israel relationship, Iran’s growing role and Turkey’s moves during a period of heightened fluidity. “The leaderships of both Cyprus and Greece must follow developments closely, assess how the situation is taking shape at every turn, and pursue closer cooperation with each other and with their allies — reinforcing existing alliances and building new, more dynamic frameworks for engagement,” the Greek expert said.
What did the intervention in Iran actually achieve? As the war ended, does this amount to a major geopolitical defeat for the United States?
We should first be quite cautious about the term “end of the war” — for two reasons. Both sides, and Iran in particular, speak only of a ceasefire plan that has begun to generate a road map for building mutual confidence. That confidence-building is a prerequisite for any agreement that could form the basis of a definitive end to hostilities. Beyond that, the agreement between the two sides depends heavily on the actions of third parties — chiefly Israel, but to some degree Hezbollah as well.
When you measure the outcomes against the objectives declared at the start of the war, it becomes clear that those objectives were not achieved by the United States and Israel. There has been no overthrow of the regime or the political system in Iran, no dismantling of its ballistic missile programme, no weakening of the Revolutionary Guards as a body that shapes the country’s broader ambitions, and no uprising among the country’s minority groups.
What we do have instead is some degree of acceptance of Iran’s role in managing the Strait of Hormuz, and negotiations that are being shaped in part by Tehran’s wishes — discussions about a reconstruction fund, the lifting of sanctions, the return of frozen Iranian assets, and so on. Even setting aside the question of winners and losers, it is very difficult not to conclude that this war was “lost” by the United States and Israel from the outset, because it was never launched with clear, specific, realistically costed objectives. The failure to achieve those objectives will have long-term consequences for both countries — the first being the realisation, among the Gulf states, that they must rapidly recalibrate their security strategies.
How do you think the talks between Washington and Tehran will play out?
It is very difficult to predict how the talks will end — particularly when we are dealing with two countries that see not only the world but the very process of negotiation in entirely different ways. There are different priorities and different readings of what is at stake. President Donald Trump, for example, is in a hurry to show his voters a deal centred on a full Iranian commitment to nuclear non-proliferation — one that improves on the 2015 agreement. For Iran, the nuclear issue is a secondary concern at best.
The gaps between the two sides — over the reparations Iran is demanding, transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, the Lebanon question, and the withdrawal of US forces from their bases in the region — could torpedo the negotiations at any stage. And as I said, Israel and Hezbollah could drive talks to an impasse at any moment.
Attention is shifting to how Israel reads these developments. Can the United States stop Israel from taking unilateral action, particularly on the Lebanese front?
It is a given that they can. Whether and to what degree they want to depends largely on internal dynamics — both within the MAGA camp and on the broader American political scene.
A major problem is that in both Iran and Israel — for different reasons — domestic politics do not guarantee the kind of swift return to stability that would meet American expectations for peace on the Lebanese front. All the parties involved, including Hezbollah, are looking outward while keeping one eye on their own domestic situations. In this web of relationships, the real question is never about capability but about will. And the will of the United States to restrain Israel depends on internal dynamics on both sides.
In Israel, society is divided — but only over how effective the Netanyahu government has been, not over what needs to be done. In practice, that means no change in Israel’s political landscape guarantees a change in policy.
What are the consequences of the turbulence in the Washington–Tel Aviv relationship, and how does it affect Cyprus?
It is too early to say, because we are still at the opening scene of the first episode of this upheaval. Cyprus, like Greece, will be among the first countries to feel the consequences — both of any strategic US withdrawal from the region and of any cooling in relations with Israel that might push the latter to escalate and extend its own efforts to create facts on the ground, whether territorial, military or political.
How likely do you now consider an internal uprising that could bring down the regime and produce a less rigid political leadership?
Overthrowing the system through popular revolt is very difficult to imagine. But it is equally difficult to see a political system carrying on with the same obsessions and the same drive for regional hegemony as if nothing has changed. What the system does need is internal renewal — and that process will have to include reining in the political and economic power of the Revolutionary Guards, revising the regime’s ideological foundations, democratising, and bringing more of the population into the democratic process.
What began as an impressive display of military power ended up as a demonstration of the limits of American power. What are the geopolitical consequences for the region?
It would be more precise to speak of a demonstration of the limits of how American military power can be deployed. This reluctance to use all available means is connected to several factors: the hesitancy of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to offer meaningful support; the ambiguous stance of the European Union; and above all the response of China, and to a lesser extent Russia.
The consequences will begin to manifest in the period ahead and will be continuously reassessed as events unfold. Iran’s resilience will strengthen its regional position. The Gulf states will have to factor that into their security strategies. And an Israel that is being asked by the United States to rein in its response to threats — primarily from Lebanon — is an extraordinarily unpredictable factor.
Following on from that — how do these consequences affect the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus?
This chain of events leads inevitably to Turkey — to the strategic choices it will make and the careful steps it will take in the period ahead. This is a Turkey that was shut out of the mediating role it sought in the US–Iran negotiations, which says a great deal about how much Tehran trusts Erdoğan. It is also a Turkey that will face growing domestic pressure because of the state of its economy. A Turkey on the verge of developments it cannot fully control is a Turkey capable of generating and exporting crises — in the Aegean, in Cyprus and across the Eastern Mediterranean.
The leaderships of Cyprus and Greece must therefore follow developments closely, assess how things are evolving at every turn, and pursue closer cooperation with each other and with their allies — reinforcing existing alliances and building new, more dynamic frameworks for engagement.
Post-war conditions: Tehran’s defining challenge
Do we have any data on what the war cost the US, Iran and Israel — and who will bear the burden and for how long?
It is too early for a full assessment. Global economic growth has slowed to 2.5 per cent. The cost to the United States has so far reached 30 billion dollars, while the cost to the Gulf states is estimated at 58 billion dollars. Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas facilities will not be fully operational again for five years. That reference to Qatar and the Gulf states carries an additional dimension: these are the countries that will bear the greatest part of the burden of reconstruction and the insecurity that the war’s outcome has created — while being excluded from the negotiations and never consulted on how they are progressing.
Although information from inside Iran is scarce, how would you assess the situation given the dominance of the Revolutionary Guards?
The great challenge for Iran’s leadership will be managing the post-war situation — how it uses reparations, oil revenues and unfrozen assets, not to mention potential fees from managing the Strait of Hormuz, to strengthen society, shore up the country’s severely damaged economy and rebuild public trust to some degree. It is an extraordinarily difficult equation that the government is being asked to solve without the convenient scapegoat of US sanctions.
The Strait of Hormuz proved throughout to be Tehran’s strongest bargaining chip. Can Iran’s ability to influence shipping and energy flows give it greater leverage on other issues, such as its nuclear programme?
For that bargaining chip to work — as it clearly has done — it has to be understood alongside a range of other factors: the resilience of Iran’s political system; the rallying of large sections of a population that had until recently risen up against that same system; the reluctance of minority groups to turn against the government; and the dispersal of weapons systems across the country.
Above all, it has to be seen in relation to Tehran’s endurance and resolve — both in absorbing strikes and in inflicting strategic blows on US-aligned neighbours. Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is part of a broader strategy of making the war as costly as possible for its adversaries, and its nuclear negotiating strategy has to be understood within that same framework.