At a critical juncture in what some are calling the third Gulf war, both the United States and Iran are claiming victory. But behind the declarations and the contradictory assessments, a more complex reality is taking shape — one that carries economic and energy consequences that nearly the entire planet will have to bear.
In an interview with Phileleftheros, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations in the UAE, Kleanthis Kyriakides, argues that the conflict is unfolding not on a single front but across multiple, interconnected theatres stretching from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon. Energy, maritime security, and the regional balance of power together form a landscape of acute geopolitical tension, where every move — military or diplomatic — carries immediate international consequences. In this environment, even a ceasefire feels less like a stable path to peace and more like a temporary pause.
At the same time, the prospects for any meaningful agreement between Washington and Tehran are weighed down by deep-rooted mutual mistrust and clashing strategic interests. Iran’s nuclear programme remains the one area where some convergence is conceivable, yet the history of unilateral withdrawals and disputed commitments casts a long shadow over any new negotiations. In a world where agreements are questioned before they are even implemented, credibility has become a rare and precious commodity.
The crisis also points to a broader and more troubling trend: the steady erosion of international law as a governing framework. In an environment where power appears to trump rules, countries like Cyprus and Greece are being forced to rethink their strategies, placing greater weight on deterrence and alliances. The world that is taking shape leaves little room for ambiguity — only a need for realism and preparation.
Both the US and Iran say they have won the war. What is actually the case? Which objectives has each side achieved?
To understand who has won, you first need to grasp that victory does not go to whoever dominates the battlefield militarily. Wars are not fought to annihilate the enemy outright — they are fought for a political objective. What the political objective of the United States actually is, nobody really knows. Regime change, at any rate, has not been achieved, since Ayatollah Khamenei has simply been replaced by his son. Iran’s nuclear programme was supposedly destroyed last summer, yet here we are talking about it again. The Strait of Hormuz still needs to be reopened — though it is worth remembering it was not closed before the war began. Very different views are circulating, and the US is still struggling to say clearly that it has won. Israel, by contrast, had regime change as its explicit goal from the outset. At present, that does not look achievable. Iran, on the other hand, if its aim was to preserve the regime, its energy infrastructure, and its missile deterrence, has managed that to a degree — though it, too, will emerge from this conflict badly bruised.
Is there any realistic way for Iran and the US to reach a deal that both sides can present as a victory?
Only if they can call black white — and that may well be what they end up having to do. There are, unfortunately, no shared points of convergence, no common ground. There is no chance Iran will stop backing its proxies — the Houthis, Hezbollah — or dismantle its missile deterrent. And there is equally no chance the Americans will pay war reparations as Tehran demands, or accept a change to the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz that would require ships to pay tolls. The one area where agreement is possible is Iran’s nuclear programme. It has happened before — there was a good deal in place, and we all remember that Donald Trump walked away from it unilaterally.
If a deal is reached, does Tehran have any reason to trust that Washington will not simply walk away again?
There is deep, longstanding mutual mistrust on both sides. The two countries have had no diplomatic relations for many years. The agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme was not a bilateral Iranian-American deal — it was an international one, and it was broken by the United States, not because the other side violated it, but on the grounds that it was not a good deal. That sets a very damaging precedent. Who is going to convince the Iranians now that any new agreement with the Americans will not be judged inadequate by the next administration and abandoned in the same way?
What is your assessment of how the war will develop? How do you read Trump’s decision to blockade Iranian ports, and what will become of the ceasefire?
I am cautiously optimistic, because I think both Washington and Tehran have realised that the war cannot deliver results for either side. Neither wants a prolonged conflict — the economic and political costs are simply too high. So I do believe the ceasefire will hold long enough for some kind of face-saving formula to be found, one that lets everyone claim victory — the way elections tend to work. I do not think the US will push ahead with a ground operation. If anything of the sort happened, it would be very limited — perhaps confined to an island — and would not extend across Iranian territory as a whole. That said, I want to stress that what we are really dealing with here is three interconnected wars: the US and Israeli war against Iran, Iran’s war against the Gulf states, and Israel’s war in Lebanon. The conflict I am least pessimistic about is the one in Lebanon — and that is because Israel is determined to strike Lebanon in much the same way it did Gaza.
What could Israel’s negotiations with Lebanon actually lead to?
How is Lebanon supposed to negotiate with 14 per cent of its territory under Israeli occupation, while it is still being bombed? How do you negotiate with the lion when your head is already in its mouth? And even setting that aside — is the Lebanese government actually in a position to negotiate? No, because it does not control its own territory. Analysts have been saying for years that Hezbollah is far more powerful than the Lebanese government — and that is not only a reflection of the Shia community’s support for it, but of its operational capabilities, which far exceed those of the Lebanese army. If Lebanon cannot control Hezbollah, how can it reach any agreement with Israel?
As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the economic and political pressure on the US and its allies increases. Does that mean Iran holds the stronger hand in negotiations?
Nobody expected Iran to close the Strait, because doing so is essentially suicidal — it hurts Iran itself as much as anyone else. Then it made this clever move of imposing tolls on ships wishing to pass, and demanding payment in yuan rather than dollars. A clearly illegal move. When the US grasped what was happening, it responded by blockading Iranian ports — not stopping Gulf state vessels wanting to pass, but those departing from Iranian ports. That creates serious problems for everyone: Iran itself, China, India, Japan, countries across southern and eastern Africa, the Gulf states, and European countries. And despite Trump’s denials, the US is feeling the pain too. That is why I expect the Strait to reopen one way or another — Tehran’s belief that it can engineer a new treaty to change the legal status of Hormuz is simply too maximalist. Hormuz has no special legal status: ships have the right of transit passage and no vessel is obliged to pay tolls to the surrounding states — Iran and Oman.
So the Strait cannot realistically come under Iranian control?
The United States could never justify accepting that. It would be the ultimate capitulation. The consequences would be enormous — just think what it would do to the cost of trade, energy, and shipping if every vessel transiting the Strait had to pay a toll. The world’s key maritime chokepoints — Gibraltar, Hormuz, Malacca — are not under the full control of any single state, and for good reason. Iran cannot simply impose its control over Hormuz. There would be pushback not only from the US and Israel but from the Gulf states, who might well take military action. For anything like this to have any legitimacy, a new treaty would need to be created, giving Hormuz a special legal status. But even then, it could not be a unilateral arrangement — what would Oman’s role be? If it happened, it would amount to the total surrender of the United States. Legitimacy would be very hard to come by. But then, let us not forget: all three of the wars I mentioned are themselves illegal. The American blockade of Iranian ports is illegal. The tolls Iran imposed are illegal. Every concept of international law has been abandoned in these conflicts.
Cyprus and Greece must strengthen deterrence
You have pointed to multiple violations of international law. Has it not been suffering for some time now?
I wish it were merely suffering — unfortunately, it no longer exists. States are not even bothering to keep up appearances any more. Personally, I want to see countries justify their actions and align them with international law. At this point, nobody does. We are in a new world, and sadly we have to learn to live in it.
What does this new world mean for Cyprus and Greece, which have an assertive Turkey on their doorstep?
It is an extremely important question. Right now, any state that feels strong — knowing there is no international law to hold it back — will make an expansionist move whenever it feels confident enough to do so. The Russians did it in Ukraine. The Chinese could very easily do it in Taiwan tomorrow. Turkey is, theoretically, stronger than both Greece and Cyprus at this moment. That means the two countries need to build a defence that is serious, robust, and strong enough to deter an adversary on our own — because it is abundantly clear that we cannot invoke international law any more, since nobody pays attention to it. And I genuinely regret saying that. I would like to see the Republic of Cyprus strengthened with aircraft, with armed forces; I would like to see more Greek ships in the Eastern Mediterranean. The message of deterrence needs to be sent — a punitive deterrence: if you move against us, the cost will be prohibitive. Because, unfortunately, nobody is coming to help us. Greece, too, must maintain a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean — not because it holds sovereign rights there, but to show that Cyprus is not alone and that it has by its side the one player that genuinely cares about it: Greece. We may be two states, but we are one nation, with the same national anthem. Our adversaries need to understand that, and that the relationship between the two countries raises the cost for any opponent that might consider moving against us.
In that context, how do you view the strategic cooperation between Nicosia and Athens and Israel?
As an analyst, I condemn Israel unreservedly. What happened in Gaza and Lebanon was, I can say it plainly, mass war crimes. And yet Israel is our own particular devil. If someone were to hypothetically ask the Greek Prime Minister or the Cypriot President whether to break off relations with Israel, my advice would be an unequivocal no — because we need it. So on the one hand, we should not place international law at the heart of our foreign policy, and on the other, we should continue our strategic relationship with Israel without blindly endorsing everything it says and does. Maintain the strategic partnership, but keep a lower profile.
Do you see the balance of power and spheres of influence in the Middle East shifting as a result of the war?
There are no major shifts yet. For now, the US is maintaining its enormous strategic alliance with Israel, and that will not change after Trump either — it is a policy backed by both parties. The Gulf states cannot overnight disengage and pivot towards China and Russia while ignoring the US — that would create a serious security problem for them. They will continue to maintain strong ties with Washington. So I do not foresee any significant realignments, and the US will continue to play a significant role in the region. Iran, for its part, never had many allies — which is understandable given the nature of its regime. It has decent relations with Russia, though Russia is consumed by its own problem called Ukraine, and with China, which is still playing the role of an asymmetric superpower — seeking economic supremacy for now, at least. I would add one thing: Turkey appears to be positioning itself for a role in rebuilding Iran. It is moving very carefully diplomatically — maintaining good relations with the West, a NATO member — exploiting the situation in every way it can.