By Pavlos Pavlou
Part A
A book was recently published by Oxford University Press that will be widely discussed and serve as a source for other books, articles, analyses, and research in many countries. This is because it includes transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations, which he recorded in secret. Thus, revealing information comes to light related to significant historical events that took place during the term of the 37th US President, Richard Nixon (1969-1974)—the first American president to resign from office due to the well-known Watergate scandal.
Given that the then-powerful Secretary of State, who held a central role (essentially as the head) of the US National Security Council, played a leading role in the dramatic events in Cyprus in 1974 with the coup and the invasion, the penultimate chapter (No. 31) of the book acquires special significance for us. it includes intercepted conversations regarding the coup, Makarios’s escape, the Sampson “presidency,” the Clerides solution, the prevention of a Greco-Turkish war, the Sisco mission, and State Department interventions.
The book is authored by Tom Wells, who has written three other books. He earned a PhD in sociology from UC Berkeley and has received fellowships and grants from various American foundations and universities. He lives in New Mexico. In the extensive introduction of his book, he refers to the way he secured and studied 20,000 pages, covering over 15,000 of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, which Kissinger himself recorded secretly.
The author describes Kissinger as one of the most influential personalities and shapers in the history of American foreign policy. He does not hide his abilities and intelligence, nor his successes; however, he simultaneously reveals dark aspects of his personality and deconstructs the myth of him as a “wizard of diplomacy.” He notes, among other things: «Henry Kissinger is one of the most polarizing figures in American history. He is regarded by many as a master in the art of diplomacy and realpolitik. His critics condemn him for committing war crimes in the Vietnam War, the genocide in East Pakistan, the undermining and overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, and support for the killings of the Pinochet dictatorship.»
Kissinger’s motive behind the recordings
Why, however, did the great Kissinger go so far as to break the law, intercepting and recording his telephone conversations, which were not intended for public use or scrutiny, but only for his own use and so that he himself could maintain control? Kissinger, according to close associates, was a person who was untidy in the conduct of his daily work, and they attribute the fact that he recorded his telephone conversations to this aspect of his character. Perhaps it was also for his memoirs, although he denied it. The author observes: «He likely had it in mind to handle the transcripts, if needed, against his opponents, or to cover himself.» Finally, we add—remembering that “no evil is without some good”—his immoderate and often extreme behaviour, combined with his thirst for executive power, led him to his illegal action, which, being revealed now, brings to light hidden, bitter, and painful truths that determined the fate of countries, peoples, and individuals. Including Cyprus and ourselves.
How he set up his own surveillance system
Initially, Kissinger ordered his secretaries and assistants to listen to his telephone conversations and take notes. Subsequently, he installed a device and requested that all his conversations be fully recorded, and in high quality at that. His secretaries often stayed until late at night to transcribe the recordings verbatim. After the transcription onto paper, the tapes were destroyed immediately.
While he was aware that he was breaking the law, he did not show particular care to keep it secret only for himself. Indeed, he did not hide from his assistants when, with various facial expressions and gestures, he mocked his interlocutors. President Nixon, as a master of wiretapping, knew that Kissinger kept a record of their conversations. Officials in the administration also suspected it, resulting in them being very careful in their telephone dealings with him. A characteristic case is that of George Shultz, a member of Nixon’s Cabinet and later Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, who was surprised when a Kissinger assistant mentioned details to him about a telephone conversation he had had with him earlier that day. When the people Kissinger spoke with raised the possibility that they were being monitored or recorded, Kissinger did not hesitate to deny it by lying. This, according to those who knew him, was an inherent element of his personality and character.
He also spoke regularly with journalists
Tom Wells also refers to Kissinger’s relationship with journalists and others. «He spent more time on the phone with journalists than with the rest of the government,» stated Roger Morris, a member of the National Security Council staff, adding: «He seduced and manipulated journalists, who respected him to a great degree. Many sought guidance from him. They felt grateful for the access he offered them, and this was a tool in his hands for their seduction. They became conduits for his views and agendas.»
Kissinger had, of course, a multitude of conversations with foreign leaders and his counterparts, ambassadors, members of Congress, and prominent businessmen, whom he despised and said «are certified idiots.» His telephone conversations, Wells writes, offer «a rich and sweeping portrait of the people of his time, a different picture of history. Sometimes intimate, often out of context. They capture raw words, insults, and schemes. They present a Kissinger “barking” orders. At other times he appears remarkably unruffled, with his own sense of humour, and then agitated, enraged, with mocking or sarcastic comments.»
Kissinger began keeping records of his telephone conversations in January 1969, two years before Nixon’s recording system was installed. While they chronologically extend into the period of the Ford presidency, the book includes only transcribed conversations from the Nixon period. They cover a wide range of events and themes. They include, among others, the Vietnam War, the US invasion of Cambodia, brutal, destructive campaigns and deadly US bombings against countries, and the heinous massacre at the My Lai village in Vietnam.
Something else that references what we are watching even today relates to Kissinger’s “disappointment” with the Israelis, their non-stop demands, their rigidity in peace talks, their aggressiveness, and the tendency to occupy more territories. About which he could do little, due to the “relentless” power of the Jewish lobby.
Regarding the events in Cyprus, the author reminds us in his introduction of the well-known fact that Kissinger strongly opposed the return of the deposed President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios; his concern about communist influence on the island; the dilemma he faced regarding whom to support for the position of president after the immediate removal of “that guy” Sampson, whom he called a “dead duck”; and the interim solution of Clerides, which was suggested to him by the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan.
How he handled the secret recordings
In the autumn of 1976, Kissinger transferred the archive of conversations to a space belonging to his Republican friend, Nelson Rockefeller, scion of the powerful business family of the same name. He did not seek approval from anyone. His own legal advisor judged that his telephone transcripts were his personal documents.
Efforts by researchers to gain access to the archive were continuous. Kissinger faced three lawsuits but came out the winner in court. Despite this, the effort did not stop. It is worth reminding, in this regard, that two Cypriot journalists, colleagues Costas Venizelos and Michalis Ignatiou, managed through their research—which was captured in their book The Secret Files of Kissinger—to secure evidence and highlight the negative role he played in the events of 1974. Previously, the busy, all-powerful politician came into the crosshairs of the highly capable British-American journalist and author, the late Christopher Hitchens, in his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger.
The author’s findings on Kissinger’s decisive role
Introducing Chapter 31 (pp. 559-581), which refers to the Cyprus issue, Tom Wells notes that Kissinger had advance knowledge of Greece’s plan to overthrow Makarios and opposed the removal of the Greek officers who controlled the National Guard. He was concerned lest the Archbishop turn to the Soviet Union to help him return to power, prioritizing the view that if he succeeded, it would lead the communists to become “the dominant force” in Cyprus. The United States avoided public support for either Makarios or Sampson. His first and urgent concern was to prevent a Greece-Turkey war. From the transcripts, it emerges clearly that he was the one handling the situation (very little by President Nixon); he is even presented as announcing developments long before they occurred!
First taste of the revealing conversations
Before we present some of the revealing excerpts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during the critical hours of the Cypriot tragedy, we judge it necessary to clarify that, because the English text records oral speech in English, our effort was to render it in Greek in a way that the meaning comes out without alteration of the substance. It is understood that researchers should also refer to the text of the book. Some explanatory interpolations in parentheses are by the writer, to help the reader.
KISSINGER-ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR—15/7/1974, 05:30 p.m. (US Time)
K.: We just received a message from Cyprus that your advisor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the intervention of Soviet troops to restore order.
D.: Troops? I doubt that very much; it sounds incredible to me.
K.: And to me. If you were planning something like that, would you tell us?
D.: Yes.
K.: You know we would not favour it.
D.: I know. What is happening with Makarios?
K.: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.
D.: I know that this (returns to the troops) could only happen if Makarios requested it and then it would have to be discussed.
KISSINGER-CALLAGHAN, UK FOREIGN SEC—16/7/74, 10:15 a.m.
Cal.: Makarios asked us for permission to go to the area of our base. We gave it to him and now we are thinking of embarking him on our plane.
K.: If that is the issue, okay; we don’t want him leading a movement and asking for help from the Soviets.
Cal.: Correct. I am going to make a statement in the House of Commons. I will say that he asked us to go to our base. I will continue by saying that our ambassador is informing the Greek government that the Greek military personnel of the National Guard must be replaced as soon as possible.
K.: Wait, I think we should not make a quick decision about that.
Cal.: That would reduce the tension in the area.
K.: As soon as the situation clears up, fine. But if there is a civil war, we will get involved.
Cal.: How do you see that?
K.: If Makarios leaves the island, my assessment will be different than if he stays and leads a civil war. My main concern is to keep external forces out of it. We can ask the Greek government to declare its intentions. For the Greek military who are there, we will return to it, but not today. As soon as things clear up, then we can do something. We do not support Enosis.
KURT WALDHEIM, UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, BRIEFS KISSINGER—16/7/74, 11:50 a.m.
[NO COMMENT FROM KISSINGER]
Waldheim: I received a telegram from my special representative in Cyprus stating that Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss what he calls Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know that four Greeks are hospitalized with injuries sustained during the coup, therefore there was Greek involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military corps is involved. The Archbishop asked the British to send a helicopter to transport him to their base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted, on the condition that the Archbishop would agree to be transferred to the United Kingdom. Makarios refused and I have authorized our general to provide protection. For us it will be a problem if the new military government has control but a president is not sworn in. We will have a problem with what to do with Makarios. The important thing is to avoid intervention by the Turks. This is the real danger.
(In tomorrow’s second part, more of the revealing dialogues included in the book).