Interview with Androula Taramounta, Andreas Bimbishis, Costas Venizelos and Frixos Dalitis
We are building a strategy to elevate Cyprus on the international stage and strengthen our capabilities in addressing domestic challenges. President of the Republic Nikos Christodoulides tells Phileleftheros, noting that the government’s strategy aims to deliver results not only for the Cypriot state but also for citizens, particularly on the pressing issues of energy and water. The President focuses on the increased turbulence and activity in our region and the role our country plays, noting that through our geostrategic role, developments will occur that will improve citizens’ daily lives and their standard of living.
—We’re in a period of intense activity recently, which highlights the role of the Republic of Cyprus as a factor shaping policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. An agreement with Lebanon, a trilateral with Israel and Greece, an agreement with France, a visit by the UAE leader. What concrete developments might emerge that citizens can actually feel?
—Let me start by saying that every foreign policy move is directly connected to domestic policy as well. For example, the agreements we recently concluded with the United Arab Emirates, France, Israel, and from 2026 with other states—with India as a priority—seek to advance our objective in practice: strengthening all our country’s power factors, both internal and external, and consequently fortifying and empowering it to address whatever challenges arise and achieve the goals we set. At the international level, we aim to highlight the geostrategic role of the Republic of Cyprus in the region, and at the domestic level to improve our citizens’ daily lives and substantially upgrade their standard of living.
A second objective—and we’re pleased to see tangible results—is that through our own actions, the EU now recognises the importance of the broader Middle East region. For example, it’s very significant that Ursula von der Leyen will come to Cyprus on 7 January for the opening ceremony of the Cypriot Presidency of the EU Council, and will subsequently travel to Syria, Jordan, and possibly Lebanon. We’re now seeing the EU understand the importance, significance, and role of the region.
Third, we believe that beyond its particular importance, the region also constitutes a point of convergence with the United States, which is showing interest in the broader prospects for cooperation. This interest can be manifested, for example, through the implementation of specific projects of geostrategic importance within IMEC—the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. I recall President Modi’s visit to Cyprus, the first in 20 years, which amongst other things highlights our country’s role as the entry point for the region’s countries into Europe. Nothing is random; all our actions have specific objectives and are based on the broader strategy I mentioned earlier.
—What did you gain from the trilateral meeting in Israel?
—During the visit to Israel, amongst other things, we discussed how to give substance to this economic and geostrategic corridor, IMEC—India, the Middle East, and Europe—through Cyprus. Within this framework, there was extensive discussion about the GSI (Great Sea Interconnector) and the need to proceed immediately, including the section concerning the Israel-Cyprus connection, which from Israel can connect to Jordan and from there to Saudi Arabia, with subsequent prospects for extension to India. It’s something that will lead to a mutually beneficial outcome for everyone.
In the same discussion, I also mentioned our recent decision with the Lebanese government—for which we’ve already approached the World Bank—regarding an electricity interconnection between Cyprus and Lebanon. Electricity is a resource for which all countries in the region must cooperate, primarily for the benefit of our citizens, whilst Cyprus is indisputably the entry point from the region into Europe.
Everything we do, therefore, is not random. We’re building a strategy to elevate Cyprus internationally and strengthen our capabilities in addressing domestic challenges. This strategy, in other words, is directly connected to domestic policy as well. For example, through our participation in IMEC we upgrade our country’s role internationally, whilst simultaneously it can help us address domestic challenges, such as reducing electricity prices. With the UAE we’re upgrading our relationship to strategic level, whilst at the same time cooperating to resolve water and energy issues. In early 2026 we’re actually preparing to sign a relevant agreement. A team of ministers from Cyprus will travel to the UAE to formalise our cooperation on water and energy.
—How will this work in practice? Through the provision of desalination plants?
—At this moment I prefer not to say more. We’ve all seen what can happen when things are disclosed prematurely.
—Regarding energy?
—On energy, we’re working towards a comprehensive agreement relating to the involvement of companies from the UAE in the Republic of Cyprus’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and more broadly in the energy sector in our country, also on the basis of our relevant energy strategy. For all this to happen—to upgrade our cooperation and for them to help us, for example, with water—they needed to see in practice Cyprus’s importance for the UAE in the region, in the EU, and internationally.
—When will these developments happen? Is there a timeline?
—Soon there will be announcements regarding these issues. The fact that in 2025 we successfully addressed the water challenges is also due to the excellent relations we’ve achieved with the UAE, which, at no cost, responded immediately to our request because of our excellent relations and provided us with desalination units.
—Has any study been conducted on desalination requirements?
—Of course, we have all the studies ready, and as I mentioned earlier, soon a team of ministers—led by the Foreign Minister and including the Ministers of Energy, Agriculture, and the Deputy Minister of Innovation—will travel to the UAE. Water and energy will be key sectors of our cooperation.
—Will the procedural issues with the Vasilikos plant be overcome?
—We want to see the project completed as soon as possible, and we’re working very specifically towards that end.
—In all this activity, what role does the American factor play?
—As I mentioned earlier, the American government’s interest in the broader region arises mainly through the opportunities emerging from IMEC. We want to give substance to IMEC, and we’re working towards this with Israel, the UAE, and other countries. Indeed, within the framework of the Cypriot Presidency of the EU Council on 24 April, when the informal European Council will take place in Cyprus, specific projects in countries of the region are expected to be announced, which will be funded by the EU. We’re in contact with countries in the region and the European Commission about which projects will be announced. For example, with the President of Lebanon we discussed specific projects, and we’re helping, at EU level, to have them included in the Mediterranean package, which—I repeat—includes specific projects that will be announced in Cyprus. All of this can also be included within the IMEC framework.
—Will we see American investments in Cyprus?
—We already have American investments following the recent investment roadshow in the US, whilst soon, in the first fortnight of January, further announcements will be made regarding American investments in Cyprus in the technology sector.
—What’s happening with the electricity interconnection with Greece?
—The project is considered of strategic importance for Cyprus, and as I mentioned earlier, we’re in continuous contact with the Greek government. At the same time, the project can also be approached within the IMEC framework, which means support both from the US and from many other actors.
—Does this mean cheaper electricity for consumers?
—Of course. That’s a fundamental objective of the project, and interconnections constitute one of the three pillars of our energy strategy. Let me also mention that Gulf countries, countries from the region, as well as the United States are interested in investing in this project.
—Mr Netanyahu is travelling to the White House; will he discuss any of these issues with Mr Trump?
—Of course. He’s already mentioned this publicly, in fact. US interest—and that of the current administration—in IMEC’s prospects and the opportunities that exist in the region is well known and declared. At the same time, Israel has repeatedly referred to the priority it places on regional synergies across a range of sectors. This potential strategic convergence is expected to be discussed in the Israeli Prime Minister’s meeting with the American President.
—Following these moves, we see there’s also a connection with the Cyprus issue. What changes with the strategic moves being made?
—What’s changing—what we’re seeing emerge—is increased interest in the substance of a Cyprus solution as well: for the Republic of Cyprus to remain a sovereign state, an EU member state, without external interventions, guarantees, and occupation troops, and for its role in the region to continue.
—What does the defence cooperation with Israel provide for? Is what was written about creating a joint Division true?
—What the cooperation provides for is more joint military exercises, synergies between defence industry companies from Cyprus, Israel, and possibly Greece—which means presence in the European market, access to European funds, and the creation of new jobs in our country. In other words, through our cooperation, we’re also promoting the Cypriot defence industry. This was also part of the agreement with France—that is, the contract for purchasing military equipment includes a clause for minimum participation by companies of Cypriot interests. The defence cooperation with Israel also provides for the purchase of military equipment to strengthen the deterrent power of the Republic of Cyprus, which is our highest priority.
—There’s an impression that roles have changed in relation to Greece and diplomatic initiatives. Now the “locomotive” is Nicosia and Athens follows to avoid Turkey’s pitfalls. Can Nicosia carry this burden?
—We don’t see it competitively with Greece in any case. Naturally, we know the broader Middle East region—our neighbourhood—better, just as Greece knows the Balkans better than us. And in any case, Greece remains our most stable and selfless ally and partner.