The conflict between Israel, Iran and the United States has entered a fragile pause — but don’t mistake it for resolution. That is the assessment of Georgios Kentas, Associate Professor of International Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia, who spoke to philenews about the shifting and uncertain landscape taking shape across the wider region.
Kentas argues that the halt reflects the limits of military force rather than any decisive outcome. Both sides made concessions, he says, because the cost of pressing on had become disproportionate to any further gain.
Iran sustained serious damage, he acknowledges, but never lost its ability to wage a war of attrition. From the conflict’s early days, it showed it could replace its leadership structure and had built a dispersed system of ballistic capabilities — drones and missiles — that proved difficult to neutralise. Beyond its own forces, the Houthis entered the fight, pro-Iranian groups in Iraq were active, and Hezbollah retained capabilities of its own. “These were elements that demonstrated Iran’s resilience and that of its allies, as well as its determination,” Kentas said.
Iran also retained the ability to threaten Gulf states — the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — with sustained attrition and the threat of strikes on energy infrastructure. That threat, combined with the fact that 20% of global energy passes through the Strait of Hormuz, gradually eroded international tolerance for the war’s continuation.
For Israel, the pause carries its own logic. A halt in hostilities with Iran frees up its full military capacity to concentrate on Hezbollah in Lebanon.
On Iran’s ceasefire proposal, Kentas is measured. Both sides want a break to regroup, he says, and while agreement is uncertain, another pause in what he describes as a prolonged war of attrition is not impossible.
Who won?
When both Donald Trump and Iran claimed victory, Kentas says they were following a familiar script. “Both sides adopt a rhetoric of dominance and victory. There are reasons why they believe they prevailed — but there are also objective reasons showing that both suffered some form of defeat,” he said.
Trump retains the option to resume hostilities at any point, Kentas notes, but faces mounting cost pressures. Republican anxiety is rising, with polling pointing to potentially serious losses in November’s midterm elections. “Trump knows that if control of Congress is lost, he will face problems,” Kentas said. The president is also losing ground in the polls — having promised to keep the US out of wars — and rising prices at home are compounding the damage.
Undermining America’s own architecture
On Trump’s threats towards NATO, Kentas draws a consistent thread across both of his terms: a hostility to multilateralism and security institutions in favour of unilateral decision-making. “He is essentially undermining a regional and global system that the Americans themselves created in order to exercise influence and control, by subsidising the security of other countries,” Kentas said.
That system, he notes, was a deliberate post-war investment. After the Second World War, the US understood it needed to invest in order to maintain strong influence, and built institutions — the World Bank, NATO — as instruments of power in the international system. Trump, Kentas argues, no longer wants the US to bear the cost of maintaining it.
An extended pause, he suggests, is likely — driven by both global economic pressures and the US electoral calendar. The stakes of resumption are high. Iran’s remaining capabilities could inflict damage that would take years to repair. Already, 17% of Qatar’s natural gas production has been destroyed, with recovery estimated to take three to five years. “This creates a domino effect,” Kentas said, “with the real impact on the global economy becoming gradually visible.”
The wider consequences are already reshaping the region’s security architecture. Developments in the Gulf are forcing a redesign of the Middle East’s security system, Kentas argues, and the Eastern Mediterranean is directly tied to whatever emerges. The assumption that a single guarantor — the United States — would underwrite Gulf security has collapsed. Countries are now actively seeking new partnerships and alliances beyond Washington.