An envoy from Ankara arrived in the occupied north on the eve of President Nikos Christodoulides’ meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Tufan Erhürman. The meeting took place last Wednesday in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar.
The Turkish ambassador Burak Özügergin made the trip to deliver Ankara’s instructions and hold final consultations. Özügergin, who handled the Cyprus issue at a technocratic level at Turkey’s foreign ministry, has followed the Cyprus problem for years and regularly dealt with developments on the island. He kept direct contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership and, when needed, spoke directly with the United Nations on Ankara’s behalf. He intervened mainly on issues the breakaway administration could not decide or manage on its own. Sources in the occupied areas say Ankara often sends such envoys on the eve of developments, even though Turkey’s Vice-President Cevdet Yılmaz recently visited the occupied north at a political level.
Ankara appears willing to give Erhürman room to manoeuvre, but only up to the point where talks avoid issues that touch the core of Turkey’s strategy.
The occupied side is clearly not ready at this stage to engage seriously in the Cyprus problem. It cites Cyprus’s presidency of the European Union as a reason. Turkey does not want developments during these six months and is deliberately running down the clock. Erhürman’s conduct in the discussions reflects that approach. The UN envoy, Holguín, seems to be adjusting to the same logic by extending the pre-negotiation phase and focusing on confidence-building measures.
Through Erhürman, the Turkish side continues to set conditions for returning to negotiations. It insists on four preconditions and puts political equality first. It links that demand to a rotating presidency and a single positive vote on all decisions – effectively a veto. Through this approach, Ankara points towards sovereign equality. In the past, the Greek Cypriot side accepted a rotating presidency and a single positive vote only in limited cases and within a broader package, not as stand-alone demands. It did so despite widespread opposition among Greek Cypriots and despite the risk that a veto would create a dysfunctional state, as happened under the 1960 constitution. Political equality, in any case, does not automatically mean a rotating presidency and veto rights.
The occupied side raises these demands while refusing to discuss other aspects of the Cyprus problem in parallel. It rejects a comprehensive, simultaneous discussion.
During the meeting, President Christodoulides put forward a five-point proposal aimed at building a framework that would gradually lead, through intermediate steps, to the resumption of negotiations. He did not treat confidence-building measures as isolated from substance. He linked the opening of proposed crossing points to the convening of a five-party conference, suggesting that any moves should take place during an expanded meeting that does not appear imminent.
Nicosia wants parallel discussions so that talks do not become trapped solely in confidence-building measures, as Ankara, Erhürman and Holguín prefer. Turkey argues for confidence-building measures framed as good-neighbourly steps. Erhürman may sometimes sound more flexible, but Ankara’s position ultimately prevails. On occasion, he appears to favour discussing and implementing confidence-building measures without ruling out a return to negotiations.
The United Nations acknowledges the difficulties and backs confidence-building measures to keep momentum alive. Holguín largely accepts that little will happen during Cyprus’s EU presidency. She nevertheless presses Nicosia for unilateral steps, repeating that the Greek Cypriot side can and should move in that direction and asking what it would cost Greek Cypriots to do so. She does not ask the same of Turkey.
Christodoulides’ five-point proposal triggered reactions both in the occupied north and in the government-controlled areas. Former Turkish Cypriot negotiator Özdil Nami responded to the criticism. He said the convergences achieved so far could be recorded in a document titled “Erhürman–Christodoulides Convergences” and serve as a meaningful starting point for a settlement process. He added that if the five points were treated as a step-by-step process rather than a fixed package, the Turkish Cypriot side should respond positively.
Erhürman also voices complaints about Christodoulides and the Republic of Cyprus in his meetings and raises them with the United Nations and foreign interlocutors. He objects to the president accompanying foreign officials to the buffer zone in old Nicosia and showing them the reality of occupation. He reacted strongly to the visit by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her remarks. The Turkish Cypriot administration regularly expresses its irritation over such visits, which Turkey derides as “barrel diplomacy” or “hole diplomacy”.
Ankara reacts because these visits highlight Turkey’s continued occupation of Cypriot territory. The barrels and barbed wire that divide old Nicosia leave a strong impression on visiting officials and underline the core issue: occupation. The United Nations also appears uneasy with such visits, arguing that they harm the atmosphere, even though no negotiation process currently exists.
Erhürman has also complained about halloumi, claiming that Christodoulides promised at their 11 December meeting to resolve the issue quickly. No progress followed, not because of the Republic of Cyprus, but because foot-and-mouth disease in the occupied areas prevents any move.
Turkey further complains that Cyprus blocks the participation of the breakaway administration in international fairs and gatherings. Nicosia consistently vetoes such appearances, especially when the Turkish Cypriot side seeks to display its own symbols, and often succeeds in doing so. With Turkey’s backing, the separatist entity protests and presents itself as wronged. These grievances underpin Erhürman’s complaints.