The Eastern Mediterranean has once again become the focus of strong, predominantly American interest, as new energy projects and planned investments by major industry companies shape a dynamically changing geopolitical environment.
Recent natural gas discoveries, new energy transport routes and the growing importance of liquefied natural gas (LNG) offer Cyprus and Greece the opportunity to gain geopolitical benefits through energy, Ioannis Papafloratos, a lawyer, international relations expert and military academy professor, told Phileleftheros in an interview.
The big question is whether developments in energy projects will not be limited to an economic level, but whether they could trigger broader changes in the region’s power balances. The upgrading of Greece and Cyprus’s role does not necessarily mean a weakening of Turkish influence. However, the Greek expert believes such a scenario is feasible, provided there is political will, close cooperation and diplomatic support from at least one powerful regional “player”.
Can the energy projects in the pipeline change the geopolitical balances in the Eastern Mediterranean? What does American interest in investments by energy giants such as Chevron mean?
It is evident that there will be significant changes at a geopolitical level, with a clear upgrading of Greece’s position on the energy map. The Americans are determined to assist Europeans in achieving complete energy independence for the old continent from Russia. Athens will now become the gateway for American liquefied natural gas (LNG) into Eastern Europe. Also, the 3+1 format (Cyprus, Greece, Israel + USA) guarantees the upgrading of the Republic of Cyprus’s role as well. The recent joint statement by the four relevant energy ministers is indicative of the new climate that is taking shape.
Which countries are the “players” that will play a decisive role in the region if the energy plans we are now seeing documented actually proceed?
It is still too early to know the new energy landscape, as it is still taking shape, as previously mentioned. However, it is certain that both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus will be decisive actors in the new scenario.
What role can Cyprus play, geostrategically and energetically, in the new environment that is being formed?
Nicosia has made significant progress in this area, serving, in a way, as a shining example for Athens. It is more or less certain that it will constitute one of the pillars of the new energy scenario taking shape, also due to its crucial geostrategic position. Moreover, in recent years, Washington has demonstrated in various ways a particular “interest” in the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, the upgrading of relations between Nicosia and Tel Aviv is noteworthy.
Will geopolitical benefits arise for Cyprus and Greece from energy deals? And what will these be?
There will be benefits both economically and geopolitically, some of which are difficult to assess at present. The two states are entering the energy map. In the future, benefits will arise both from transit (due to transit fees but also from the transport of LNG by ships with Greek and Cypriot interests) and from extraction, when it begins. The geopolitical upgrading of the two countries’ position is considered certain by all analysts. As a result, Turkey will be more careful in displaying its aggression, without this of course meaning that it will suspend it. After all, an American minister recently said in Athens that “energy security means national security”.
Cyprus’s relationship with the US has been upgraded, with many characterising it as geostrategic. Is this, however, enough for Nicosia to limit Ankara’s influence?
Certainly, it is not enough, but it is a very good start. The Republic of Cyprus would do well to continue and intensify its multidimensional foreign policy, highlighting its many and indisputable advantages.
Following on from the previous question, what role and what involvement do you believe Turkey will have in energy plans in the Eastern Mediterranean? Israel, Cyprus and Greece seem to want this role to be limited if not minimal. Is such a thing possible?
I will start with the second part of your question. Of course it is feasible, provided there is political will, close cooperation and diplomatic support from at least one powerful regional “player”. As for Ankara’s possible reaction, it should be expected, but I would not want to enter into hypothetical scenarios.
What are the chances of success for the 5×5 conference? Does the Greek government’s initiative hide potential dangers and challenges?
Certainly, there are many difficulties, starting with Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Now, however, it will become apparent whether Ankara is willing to engage in sincere and serious negotiations.
For what reasons is Egypt developing into a pivotal factor in shaping the balances in the Eastern Mediterranean? How can Cyprus exploit the good relations it has with Egypt to safeguard its interests in the region?
There are many reasons. Let us not forget Egypt’s crucial geostrategic position, its population, the influence it wields in the wider region, and so on. Nicosia must strengthen its ties with Cairo, as it constitutes a strategic partner, whilst Egypt has also been targeted by Ankara, which keenly desires to restore close relations with it, even though they have opposing interests in various parts of the world.
How do you assess the energy agreements and projects announced in Athens during the P-TEC? What does it mean that Greece has the potential to become a gateway for American LNG into Europe?
The recent Greek-American agreements are of fundamental importance. If all goes well, Athens could follow Tel Aviv’s example, whose economy was transformed after the natural gas discoveries in recent years. The Americans will emerge as a key supplier to the region and Greece will be transformed into a major transit hub, as the channelling of large quantities will take place through the Greek system. In addition, Greek shipping will also benefit, due to its fleet of LNG transport vessels.
In the coming years, a significant increase in natural gas demand in Central and Eastern Europe of 15-17 billion cubic metres annually is expected, whilst another 15-16 billion is the gap that will be created by the cessation of Russian gas. Greece can cover a significant part of these quantities, as the export potential from the Greek system (with the upgrades that have been made and those planned) will reach 10 billion cubic metres. If Athens proceeds with commercial agreements and upgrades its rail network, the benefits will be manifold.
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